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Beneficial Owner: Judicial Variety in Interpretation
Counteracted by the 2012 OECD Proposals?*
Jan Gooijer**
The 2012 OECD proposals on beneficial ownership aim to remove the existing ambiguity and differences in interpretation of this concept. This
contribution contains an assessment of the proposals taking into account the historical development of the concept and case law from various countries.
Some further amendments are proposed that will help to achieve a uniform interpretation.
1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The meaning of the term ‘beneficial owner’ as referred to
in Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention (‘OECD MC’) has long been subject to
discussion.1 As the OECD explained, the publication of
the discussion draft entitled Clarification of the meaning of
‘beneficial owner’ in the OECD Model Tax Convention on 29
April 2011 was prompted by the varying ways in which
national courts and other parties have interpreted the
term.2 Following the comments received in response to
this draft, a revised version (Revised Proposals concerning the
Meaning of Beneficial Owner in Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention)3 was published on 19
October 2012. As well as the relevance that the OECD’s
initiative has for international tax law from a theoretical
perspective, the recent discussions in both the political
world and the media on issues such as the use of conduit
companies make it abundantly clear that this topic is also
of great importance to broader society.
This contribution focuses on whether the changes
proposed by the OECD will remove the ambiguity and
put an end to the resultant differing interpretations by
national courts, such that courts will in future be able to
assume a uniform meaning. If it is concluded that this is
not the case, or that it applies to only a limited degree, it
needs to be established what still has to be done in order
to ensure a uniform interpretation.4
2 STRUCTURE OF THIS CONTRIBUTION
The first step in answering the questions at the centre of
this contribution is to establish how national courts are
currently interpreting the term.5 The examination of case
law, which is discussed in section 5, drew on the IBFD’s
tax treaty case law database. A degree of caution needs,
however, to be exercised in respect of the judgments used
as the basis for assessing how terms in the OECD MC are
interpreted by national courts. First, these judgments
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relate to the interpretation of a specific treaty in a specific
case, and the interpretation’s significance for the OECD
MC may therefore be limited. Second, not all these
judgments have been substantiated equally, logically, and
consistently, and so their meaning is not always entirely
clear.6 Third, language barriers meant it was not always
possible to examine all the judgments in the language in
which they were originally given, and recourse sometimes
had to be sought to English summaries.7 The summaries
of judgments in the IBFD database and the subsequent
discussions in international tax law literature are assumed
to form a sufficient substantive basis for the research.
In order to ensure a proper reading of the case law
discussed in section 5 it is important to understand how
the term ‘beneficial owner’ has developed over time. This
will also help in understanding the changes proposed by
the OECD. Section 4 consequently serves as an
introduction to section 5 by outlining the history of the
term since it was first introduced in 1977. Section 6 goes
on to discuss and comment on the proposed OECD
Commentary, with the proposals included in full insofar as
relevant to this contribution. Answers to the questions at
the centre of this contribution are provided in section 7.
First, however, the terms ‘income conduit’ and ‘entity
conduit’ are explained in section 3 in order to ensure that
the way they are used in the rest of the contribution is
correctly understood.
3 ‘INCOME CONDUIT’ AND ‘ENTITY CONDUIT’
As in Wheeler,8 this contribution makes a distinction
between an ‘income conduit’ and an ‘entity conduit’. This
distinction is important for a proper understanding of the
case law examined, while various OECD reports also refer
to both types of conduits, particularly the entity conduit.
These types of conduits are described below.
Both conduits receive income in the form of dividends,
interest, or royalties. An income conduit has a certain
obligation to pass on income it receives and will normally
be subject to a low effective rate of tax because the income
passed on will be able to be deducted as an expense from
the income received. Assuming an income conduit can be
considered the beneficial owner of the income received, it
can claim eligibility for the reduced rate of withholding
tax available under the tax treaty between the state in
which the income conduit has its seat and the source state.
An entity conduit, however, has no obligation to pass
on income received. The effective rate of tax on such a
conduit – an intermediate holding company, for example,
– will be low, either thanks to its being eligible for a form
of participation exemption or to the low rate of tax
applying. Like an income conduit, an entity conduit can
also claim eligibility for the benefits under the tax treaty
between the residence and source states, but obviously
only if it can be designated the beneficial owner.
4 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT9
4.1 Introduction of ‘Beneficial Owner’ in the
OECD MC 1977
The term ‘beneficial owner’ was introduced into the
OECD MC in 1977 at the initiative of the United
Kingdom (‘UK’).10 In 1967, the OECD had asked the
Member States to list the aspects in the 1963 draft OECD
MC that were causing problems for them. The UK
delegation favoured amending Articles 10, 11, and 12 in
order to prevent abuse.11 The delegation stated that the
relief provided for under these articles should apply only if
the beneficial owner of the specific income was resident in
the other contracting state. It was, therefore, proposed
adding either of the following two conditions: (1) the
income received must be subject-to-tax or, (2) the income
must be beneficially owned by the recipient.
The delegation referred to protocols in the UK’s 1966
treaties with the United States (‘US’) and Switzerland, in
which eligibility for relief required the amounts paid to be
‘beneficially owned by a resident’. According to the
delegation, this clarified what had originally been
intended.12 The new protocols in these treaties marked a
departure from the original requirement of being subject
to tax.13 Under subsection 4 of the dividend article in
these treaties, this requirement continued to apply only in
situations in which the shares on which the dividend was
Notes
6 See also David A. Ward, ‘Use of foreign court decisions in interpreting tax treaties’, in J. Wouters et al. Courts and Tax Treaty Law (G. Maisto ed., IBFD 2007), para. 7.1.
7 C. Du Toit, supra, p. 501.
8 J. Wheeler, supra, p. 478.
9 The historical documents referred to are available via <www.taxtreatieshistory.org>. For a very detailed examination of the history of the concept see R. Vann, Beneficial
Ownership: What Does History (and Maybe Policy) Tell Us, in Duff et al. supra, Ch. 19.
10 For a discussion of the background to the term ‘beneficial owner’, see J.F. Avery Jones, The United Kingdom’s Influence on the OECD Model Tax Convention, British Tax Review
2011, No. 6, p. 677.
11 ‘(…) otherwise the Articles are open to abuse by taxpayers who are resident in third countries and who could, for instance, put their income into the hands of bare nominees
who are resident in the other contracting State.’ TFD/FC/216.
12 ‘(…) clearly reflects what was intended by the Committee when the Model Convention was prepared.’ TFD/FC/216 and TFD/FC/218.
13 The protocol states that ‘(…) relief from tax on dividends, interests and royalties . . . in the country of origin will no longer depend on whether the recipient is subject to
tax in the other country, but will depend on the income being beneficially owned by a resident of the other country’. Du Toit [supra, p. 1] states that the term ‘beneficial
owner’ as used in the treaty between the UK and US has to be interpreted in accordance with national law, given that the term derives from the common law tradition.
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distributed were not obtained ‘for bona fide commercial
reasons and not primarily for the purpose of securing the
benefit of this Article’ and providing a number of other
conditions were satisfied. The 1966 treaty between the
UK and Canada also included comparable provisions, both
in respect of the conditions for entitlement to withholding
tax relief on income (‘beneficially owned by a resident’)
and in respect of the anti-abuse provision in the dividend
article. The interest article, however, contained a different
anti-abuse provision.14 Subsection 5 of the article imposed
a subject-to-tax requirement if the beneficial owner sold
the underlying asset within three months of the date on
which it was acquired.
Working Party 27 (‘WP 27’)15 was instructed by the
OECD Fiscal Committee to examine the UK’s proposal in
more detail. WP 27 adopted a conservative stance by
concluding that a subject-to-tax approach was not
considered consistent with the spirit or structure of the
OECD MC,16 while the requirement for the recipient to
be ‘actually resident’ was seen as evident from the wording
of paragraph 1.17 It was not felt necessary to introduce the
concept of the beneficial owner, and the discussion
consequently reverted to the Fiscal Committee.18
Between 1967 and 1969, the UK agreed new treaties
with various other countries (mainly OECD members)19
and protocols for addition to existing treaties.20 The
articles on dividends, interest, and royalties in these
treaties and protocols were not revised in line with the
OECD’s 1963 draft-MC.21 Apart from a few details,
therefore, most of these provisions are the same as in the
articles referred to above in the UK’s treaties with
Switzerland, the US, and Canada. It is only in the treaties
with Luxembourg (1967), Belgium (1967), and France
(1968) that the UK included the subject-to-tax
requirement instead of the requirement for beneficial
ownership. All the treaties also include an anti-abuse
provision, the contents of which are largely similar to
Article 4 of the treaty with Switzerland, albeit that the
subject-to-tax clause in some of the treaties is worded
differently22 or has been omitted.23
The UK delegation’s proposals were examined during
the discussions of the first WP 27 report, when the
delegation once again pushed for inclusion of a subject-to-
tax clause or a beneficial ownership condition. The Swiss
and US delegations opted in favour of the beneficial
ownership condition; this was not illogical, given the
protocols they had recently agreed with the UK. The
German delegation, however, saw no need to include the
beneficial ownership concept in the Model Convention as,
in its view, the text was already sufficiently clear. All that
was needed, Germany believed, was to amend the
Commentary in respect of this point.24 The issue of the
anti-abuse provisions included in the various treaties
agreed by the UK did not actually come up for discussion.
The consultations resulted in a recommendation by WP
27 to introduce the concept of beneficial ownership. WP
27 felt that a subject-to-tax clause could potentially create
problems as far as interpreting the concept of ‘subject to
Notes
Avery Jones [supra, p. 680] suggests that the US and Switzerland opted for the concept of beneficial ownership rather than subject to tax for reasons relating to tax-exempt
entities such as pension funds. Baker refers to documents from the UK national archives to show that the position of tax-exempt bodies was the reason why the UK
negotiators regarded the term as an alternative to the subject-to-tax requirement. The first occasion on which the UK proposed using the term ‘beneficial owner’ was in the
treaty negotiations with the Netherlands. See P. Baker, ‘The Meaning of “Beneficial Ownership” as Applied to Dividends under the OECD Model Tax Convention’, in K.
Lenaerts et al. Taxation of Intercompany Dividends under Tax Treaties and EU Law, G. Maisto (ed.) IBFD 2012, para. 6.2.
14 Article 10 (interest) states:
1. The United Kingdom tax on interest (on bonds, securities, debentures, or on any other form of indebtedness) derived and beneficially owned by a resident of Canada
shall not exceed 15 per cent of the gross amount of the interest.
2. The Canadian tax on interest (on bonds, securities, debentures, or on any other form of indebtedness) derived and beneficially owned by a resident of the United
Kingdom shall not exceed 15 per cent of the gross amount of the interest. (…)
5. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply to interest where the beneficial owner of the interest:
(a) Is not subject to tax in respect thereof in the territory of which it is a resident; and (b) Sells (or makes a contract to sell) the holding from which the interest is
derived within three months of the date on which such beneficial owner acquired that holding.
See also TFD/FC/214.
15 The name was later changed to ‘Working Group’, but for clarity’s sake I have used the abbreviation ‘WP’ throughout this contribution.
16 ‘If it is the desire of the United Kingdom Delegation to make relief in the country of source dependent on effective liability to tax in the recipient’s country of residence,
then the suggestion would be contrary to the spirit and the general arrangement of the Draft Convention.’ FC/WP27(68)1.
17 ‘On the other hand, it is evident that relief in the country of source applies only if the recipient is actually resident in the other contracting State. This is stated clearly in the
text of paragraph 1. Moreover, determining who is the true recipient and his State of residence is a matter of administration and inspection.’ FC/WP27(68)1.
18 ‘The Committee will be asked to give its opinion on the comment made by the United Kingdom Delegation.’ FC/WP27(68)1.
19 The Netherlands (1967), Luxembourg (1967), Belgium (1967), Portugal (1968), France (1968) and Finland (1969).
20 Denmark (1968) and Sweden (1968).
21 DAF/FC/69.8.
22 The treaty with the Netherlands (1967) states, for example, ‘does not suffer tax thereon’. Paragraph six of the interest article in the treaty between the Netherlands and the
UK includes the following anti-abuse provision: ‘The provisions of this Article shall not apply if the debt-claim in respect of which the interest is paid was created or
assigned mainly for the purpose of taking advantage of this Article and not for bona fide commercial reasons.’ The concept of beneficial ownership would appear not to be
considered suitable as a means of combating such structures.
23 In, for example, the treaty with Finland (1969).
24 DAF/FC/69.10, para. 25.
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effective taxation’ was concerned and also regarded such a
clause as contravening ‘the spirit and general economy of the
Draft Convention’, and it did not envisage the existing text
causing any significant problems for a ‘genuine’ agent.25 Ac-
cording to theWP, the term ‘beneficial owner’was important
only in order to avoid granting treaty benefits to a person
receiving income, whether in its own name or otherwise, for
the account and risk of another party. The Fiscal Committee
consequently decided to amend the text of and the Com-
mentary onArticle 11 as follows:
Article 11 – Interest
1. Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a
resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in
that other State if such resident is the beneficial owner of the
interest [underlining: JG].
(…)
Commentary on Article 11
18. (…) The purpose of the condition added at the end
of paragraph 1 of the Article [beneficial ownership, JG] is
to ensure that the relevant residential qualification shall
be residence in the other State by the person beneficially
entitled to the interest and not residence there by any
intermediary such as an agent or nominee, interposed
between the payer and the beneficiary having the legal
right to receive the income. The term ‘paid’ is capable
of very wide construction, since the concept of
‘payment’ means ‘the fulfilment of the obligation to put
funds under the control of the creditor in the manner
required by contract or by custom.26/27
Article 12 and the Commentary on it were also amended
accordingly.
4.2 Abuse of TaxTreaties (I): Working Party 21
Another working party (‘WP 21’), which was established
alongside WP 27, was instructed to compile an inventory
of cases involving the abuse of tax treaties and to make
recommendations for measures to combat such actual or
alleged abuse. One aspect attracting particular attention in
this context was the use of legal entities in third states
specifically for the purpose of obtaining access to treaty
benefits.28 WP 21’s main focus was on the use of entity
conduits.
Although a detailed examination of the work of WP 21
would go beyond the scope of this contribution, it is
important in my view to consider its ultimate
conclusions.29 WP 21 suggested that the extent to which
tax relief was available on dividends in a situation in
which a company in a third state was interposed in order
to obtain access to the benefits under a tax treaty between
that third state and the source state should depend on the
extent of taxation at the intermediate holding company
level. In other words, a subject-to-tax requirement should
apply.30 The same solution was also proposed for
interest.31 However these conclusions did not result in an
anti-abuse provision being included in the OECD MC.
The work of WP 21 resulted in paragraphs 7–10 being
included in the Commentary on Article 1 OECD MC
1977, whereby the important provisions as far as this
contribution is concerned are as follows:
8. Moreover, the extension of the network of double
taxation conventions still reinforces the impact of such
manoeuvres as they make it possible, through the
creation of usually artificial legal constructions, to
benefit both from the tax advantages available under
certain domestic laws with the reliefs from tax provided
for in double taxation conventions.
9. This would be the case, for example, when a person
(whether or not a resident of a Contracting State),
would act through a legal entity created in a State
essentially to obtain treaty benefits which would not be
available directly to such person. (…)
10. Some of these situations are dealt with in the
Convention, e.g. by the introduction of the concept of
‘beneficial owner’ (in Articles 10, 11 and 12) (…). Such
problems are also mentioned in the Commentaries on
Article 10 (paragraphs 17 and 22), Article 11
(paragraph 12), [and] Article 12 (paragraph 7). It may
be appropriate for Contracting States to agree in
bilateral negotiations that any relief from tax should not
apply in certain cases, or to agree that the application of
the provisions of domestic laws against tax avoidance
shall not be affected by the Convention.32
Notes
25 ‘There is no reason to think that the case of the person acting manifestly as an agent in the name and on behalf of the beneficial owner gives rise to any difficulties.’ FC/
WP27(70)1.
26 FC(71)1.
27 In the case of the dividend article, Working Party 23 agreed with the findings and recommendations of Working Party 27. CFA/WP1(73)2.
28 FC/WP21 (67)1.
29 See for such detailed examination Vann, supra, para. 19.4.2.
30 CFA/WP1(75)3.
31 CFA/WP1(75)3, p. 23. In a previous report WP 21 had incidentally made two other, much more radical suggestions. Although these suggestions were not discussed in any
further detail for reasons of a largely administrative nature, they indicate that the concept of beneficial owner was in any event not considered sufficient. According to the
WP, the treaty could state (a) that a base company did not constitute a company for the purposes of applying the treaty, and that this would mean that distributions by such
a company would not qualify for a reduced rate of withholding tax, or (b) that a base company could constitute a permanent establishment of its shareholder’s enterprise. FC/
WP21(67)1, p. 39.
32 DAF/CFA/WP1/76.19, p. 146.
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The references to paragraphs 17 and 22 of the
Commentaries on Article 10 refer to situations in which
transactions are entered into in order to obtain treaty
benefits or where entity conduits are used for this
purpose.33
4.3 Assessment of OECD MC 1977
It can be concluded from the considerations and solutions
proposed in the various WP 27 and WP 21 reports34 and
the text of the Commentaries on Articles 1, 10, 11, and 12
OECD MC 1977 that the concept of beneficial owner is
considered an anti-abuse provision with limited scope.
The requirement for a beneficial owner can be seen as
further refining the terms ‘paid to’ and ‘received by’,
although in certain countries these terms, too, are not
interpreted literally.35
The concept was not considered suitable for combating
the abuse of tax treaties through the use of entity conduits.
Although the use of income conduits was not explicitly
discussed, the chosen wording (‘any intermediary such as
an agent or nominee’) means the possibility cannot be
excluded that an intermediary not constituting an ‘agent
or nominee’ can nevertheless disqualify as a beneficial
owner.36 The question remains, however, as to when such
an intermediary will be considered to exist.
4.4 Abuse of TaxTreaties (II):The ‘Conduit
Report’
The abuse (alleged or otherwise) of tax treaties and the role
of the beneficial ownership concept in combating such
abuse was examined again in the 1986 Double Taxation
Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies report (the
‘Conduit Report’).37 This report considers, both for entity
and income conduits, whether the changes in the 1977
OECD MC can be regarded as satisfactory. On the subject
of beneficial ownership, the report states the following in
paragraph 14(b):
Articles 10 to 12 of the OECD Model deny the
limitation of tax in the state of source on dividends,
interest and royalties if the conduit company is not its
beneficial owner. Thus the limitation is not available
when, economically, it would benefit a person not
entitled to it who interposed the conduit company as an
intermediary between himself and the payer of the
income. The commentaries mention the case of a
nominee or agent. The provisions would however apply
also to other cases where a person enters into contracts
or takes over obligations under which he has a similar
function to those of a nominee or agent. Thus a conduit
company cannot normally be regarded as the beneficial
owner if, though the formal owner, it has, as a practical
matter, very narrow powers which render it, in relation
to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or
administrator acting on account of the interested
parties. This is however different if the beneficial owner
is equally resident in the state of the formal recipient.
(…) In practice, however, it will usually be difficult for
the country of source to show that the conduit company
is not the beneficial owner.
The committee ultimately decided that the beneficial
owner concept was not suited for resolving the problem of
conduit companies,38 given the statement in paragraph 15
that ‘The new provisions of the 1977 OECD Model thus
deal with the conduit situation in a rudimentary way,
expressing only a general concern that improper use of
treaties should be avoided.’ In my view, this conclusion is
wholly consistent with the results of the WP 21 report
(see 4.2 above).
4.5 Commentary on the 2003 OECD MC
The Commentary on the 2003 OECD MC examines the
beneficial owner concept in more detail. According to the
notes on the 2003 amendments, the primary focus is on
the income conduit:
While it is obvious that the use of the concept excludes
bare legal ownership as the criterion for determining
availability of treaty benefits it is less apparent what is
intended to be the salient connection with a stream of
income in a case where different interests in the income
Notes
33 Paragraph 17 relates to transactions entered into for the sole purpose of complying with the conditions needed to obtain the reduced rate of tax (the 25% requirement, for
example), while para. 22 relates to entity conduits. In both situations states are asked to consider including a specific anti-abuse rule.
34 Unfortunately the report on the discussions of the final WP 21 report was not included in the relevant document (DAF/CFA/WP1/76.1).
35 See the US case Aiken Industries v. Commissioners, 56 T.C. 925 (1971), in which the US court – on the basis, interestingly, of a national law definition– stated that ‘The words
“received by” refer not merely to the obtaining of physical possession on a temporary basis of funds representing interest payments from a corporation of a contracting State,
but contemplate complete dominion and control over the funds.’
36 Vann, supra [para. 19.4.2.] concludes that the term beneficial ownership throughout the WP21 reports is used in two different senses being on the one hand a reference to
the ultimate economic owner and on the other hand the use of nominees and holding companies to obtain treaty benefits. See, amongst others, Collier, supra, p. 690, Duff,
supra, fn. 120 (‘… the concept of beneficial owner is sufficiently open-ended when divorced from its common law foundations (..) to apply to conduit company
arrangements’) and P. Pistone, ‘Italy: Beneficial Ownership as Anti-Abuse Provision in International Taxation’, in Duff et al. supra, fn. 6, who recognize the anti abuse
character of the beneficial owner concept.
37 OECD, ‘Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies’, Issues in International Taxation No. 1, in International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Paris 1987.
38 See also Collier, supra, p. 688.
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are held by diverse hands who might each be
considered, as a matter of general law, to possess some
attributes of ownership.39
Paragraphs 12 and 12.1 of the Commentary on Article 10
of the OECD MC 2003 state, insofar as relevant, that:
12 (…) The term ‘beneficial owner’ is not used in a
narrow technical sense, rather, it should be understood
in its context and in light of the object and purposes of
the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance.
12.1 (…) It would be equally inconsistent with the
object and purpose of the Convention for the State of
source to grant relief or exemption where a resident of a
Contracting State, otherwise than through an agency or
nominee relationship simply acts as a conduit for
another person who in fact reserves the benefit of the
income concerned. For these reasons, the report from
the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled ‘Double
Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit
Companies’ concludes that a conduit company cannot
normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though
the formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very
narrow powers which render it, in relation to the
income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator
acting on account of the interested parties.
Views in literature on the impact of these amendments
vary substantially. While Baker, for example, regards it as
‘relatively easy to understand and (…) quite narrow in its
scope as to who are not beneficial owners of the income’,40
others see the changes as a conscious (but failed) attempt
to restructure the concept of beneficial owner into a broad
anti-abuse provision.41 I disagree with this latter
conclusion. As I explained earlier, I see the 1977 changes
as having created scope for intermediaries other than
‘agents and nominees’ not to be considered beneficial
owners. This would apply in situations in which an
intermediary – subject to all the applicable legal
obligations – de facto has the same role as an agent,
despite formally being the owner of the funds received.42
In my opinion, the 2003 changes therefore represent a
further elaboration rather than a new interpretation of the
concept of beneficial owner. However, the wording of the
added paragraphs resulted in some countries in – as Vann
puts it – ‘an aggressive, essentially discretionary, use by
the tax administration of “beneficial ownership” in recent
times to deny treaty benefits’.43
5 CASE LAW
This section examines case law involving the concept of
beneficial owner,44/45 with a distinction being made
between cases before and after publication of the 2003
Commentary on the OECD MC.
5.1 Case Law before 2003
The judgments in four of the cases examined were issued
before the OECD Commentary was amended in 2003. The
critical issue for both the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge
Raad) in the ‘market maker’ case46 and the Spanish Tax
Court (Tribunal Economico Administrativo Central) and
National Court (Audiencia Nacional)47 was whether the
receiving company was the legal owner of the dividends
and royalties paid. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that
the company receiving the dividends did not need to be
the legal owner of the shares in order to be considered the
Notes
39 OECD, 2002 Reports Related to the OECD Model Tax Convention, No. 8, para. 23.
40 Baker, supra, para. 6.2.
41 See, for example, L. Verdoner, R. Offermans and S. Huibregtse, A Cross-Country Perspective on Beneficial Ownership – Part 1, European Taxation, September 2010 and E.
Robert, Who Is the True Taxpayer, European Taxation 2012, No. 2/3, p. 55.
42 Collier [supra, p. 693]: ‘On this basis, it might be difficult to see quite why the term has been proving to be so very problematic in practice.’
43 Vann, supra, para. 19.5.2.
44 The scope of the concept is considered in 22 of the cases included in the IBFD database under ‘beneficial owner’. Most of the cases examined dated from after the
amendment of the OECD Commentary in 2003, with only four cases dating back earlier. Although these older cases were included in the examination, the dictum may be
considered less important, given that the judgments did not take account of recent developments. A number of the judgments were also discussed in A.M. Jiménez,
Beneficial Ownership: Current Trends, World Tax Journal 2010, No. 2, pp. 35–63; F.P.G. Pötgens, ‘Uiteindelijk gerechtigde onder Nederlandse belastingverdragen: nationaal
recht of context’, in K. Braun et al. (eds), 40 Jaar Cursus Belastingrecht. Opstellen aangeboden aan Leno Sillevis en Nico de Vries, ter gelegenheid van hun afscheid als hoofdredacteur
respectievelijk lid van de hoofdredactie bij het 40-jarig bestaan van de Cursus Belastingrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2010, pp. 167–176, and L. Verdoner, R. Offermans and S.
Huibregtse, A Cross-Country Perspective on Beneficial Ownership – Part 1, European Taxation 2010, No. 9 and A Cross-Country Perspective on Beneficial Ownership – Part 2,
European Taxation 2010, No. 10 and in Duff et al. supra, Chs 2 (UK), 3 (Canada), 4 (Switzerland), 5 (Netherlands), 6 (Denmark), 8 and 12 (Spain), 10 and 11 (France).
45 Banfi and Manegazza discuss two judgments by a lower Italian court that are not included in the IBFD database: Commissione Tributaria Provinciale of 11 Feb. 2010 (No. 14)
and 19 Oct. 2010 (No. 124). Both cases relate to an income conduit receiving royalties. In both cases the court referred to the anti-abuse nature of the term (based on the
2003 OECD Commentary) and assessed the situation on the basis of an analysis of the actual activities of the company receiving the royalties and the decision-making
processes. In this way the term ‘beneficial owner’ was given an economic interpretation, while no attention seemed to be paid to the issue of ownership (‘very narrow
powers’). L. Banfi and F. Mantegazza, An Update on the Concept of Beneficial Ownership from an Italian Perspective, European Taxation 2012, No. 2/3, pp. 57–66. See for Italian
case law also Pistone, supra, Ch. 12.
46 Hoge Raad, 6 Apr. 1994, BNB 1994/214.
47 Tribunal Economico Administrativo Central, 22 Sep. 2000, RG 6294/1996. The issue here concerned the application of Art. 12 of the tax treaty between Spain and the US to
royalty payments made to companies managing copyrights for and on behalf of authors. The court ruled that the companies had to be regarded as intermediaries acting on
behalf of the authors and so could not be seen as the beneficial owners of the royalties received. The judgment of the Tribunal Economico Administrativo Central was confirmed
by the Audiencia Nacional on 19 Jun. 2003. See also Jiménez, supra, p. 36.
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beneficial owner of the dividends. Instead, it was sufficient
for that party, after purchasing the coupons, to have
discretion to use the specific coupons and the dividends
received.48
The German Fiscal Court (Finanzhof) in Cologne49 and
the French Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil
d’Etat)50 took non-juridical circumstances into account in
the cases examined. Both cases concerned an income
conduit. The critical issue in the view of the German court
was that the company to which the royalties received by
the conduit were passed had a decisive vote on the
licensing agreements signed by the conduit, while the
court in the French Diebold Courtage case ruled that the
extent and nature of the services provided by the affiliated
company (which in this case received 68% of the royalties)
justified the onward payment. The fact that the payment
was passed on did not cause the French court to conclude
that the income conduit was not a beneficial owner.51
5.2 Case Law Since 2003
United Kingdom
The ruling by the English Court of Appeal in the Indofood
case52 was the first judgment to make explicit reference to
the 2003 OECD Commentary. This was a civil case in
which the court was asked to rule on the opportunity to
reduce the withholding tax on interest paid by a resident
of Indonesia to a private limited company (‘Newco’)
resident in the Netherlands. Under the structure, Newco
was to pass on all the interest it received to the holders of
loan notes issued and would receive a separate fee for the
costs and risks incurred.53 The court referred to the
Conduit Report, the 2003 OECD Commentary and
Baker’s commentary in concluding that the term
‘beneficial owner’ had a tax treaty meaning autonomous of
national law. In order to be regarded as the beneficial
owner of income, the company needed to have ‘the full
privilege to directly benefit from the income’. The Court
of Appeal concluded that this requirement was not
satisfied in this case as Newco was obliged to pass on all
funds received to the bondholders and was contractually
precluded from finding or using money from other
sources.54 The court emphasized that what happened in
practice also led to the same conclusion. In other words,
that it was impossible to conceive of any circumstances in
which Newco would derive any direct benefit from the
interest payable, except by funding its liability to the
bondholders. ‘Such an exception can hardly be described as
the “full privilege” needed to qualify as the beneficial
owner, rather the position of the Issuer and Newco equates
to that of an “administrator of the income”.’55
Indonesia
The Indonesian court reached the same conclusion in
PUT-2328856 (which involved the same pattern of facts as
in Indofood) and, in doing so, also referred to tax literature
and the 2003 OECD Commentary. The fact that a
substance-over-form approach should be applied had
previously been established by the Indonesian court.57
There, too, the court referred to the OECD Commentary
and stated that the term ‘beneficial owner’ had an
autonomous tax treaty meaning not derived from the
domestic laws of the contracting states.
Notes
48 Van Weeghel stated that the Supreme Court disregarded the question of whether this freedom should be assessed procedurally or substantively. The examples given by the
Supreme Court point, he believes, towards a procedural, juristic interpretation. See S. van Weeghel in his role as expert witness in Prévost Car Inc. (2008 TCC 231), 22 Apr.
2008 (http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/en/2008/2008tcc231/2008tcc231.html). D.S. Smit is of the same opinion. D.S. Smit, ‘The Concept of Beneficial Ownership and Possible
Alternative Remedies in the Netherlands Case Law’, in Duff et al. supra, para. 5.2.4.1.
49 Finanzhof Köln, 24 Oct. 1996, 2 K 3358/93. X BV (a resident of the Netherlands) passed 95%–98% of the royalties received from Germany to a resident (‘X ltd’) of a non-
treaty state under a sub-licensing agreement. As all the licensing agreements had to be submitted to X ltd for prior approval, the German court ruled that X BV was not the
beneficial owner of the royalties.
50 Conseil d’Etat, 13 Oct. 1999, 191191, 8 and 9. See also B. Gilbert and Y. Oaumrane, Beneficial Ownership – A French Perspective, European Taxation 2008, No. 1, pp. 2–9.
51 See for a detailed discussion of the Diebold-case D. Gutmann, ‘Beneficial Ownership without Specific Beneficial Ownership Provision, in Duff et al. supra, Ch. 10. Gutmann
points to the fact that due to an advice of the French Supreme Administrative Court in 2009 the practical impact of the decision in the Diebold-case is rather insignificant.
52 Indofood International Finance Limited v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., London Branch, [2006] EWCA Civ 158, [2006] STC 1195. For a discussion, see R.F. and J.D.B.O.,
Treaty shopping and beneficial ownership: Indofood International Finance Limited v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., London Branch, British Tax Review 2006, pp. 422–429 and
P. Baker, Beneficial ownership: After Indofood, GITC Review, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2007, pp. 15–28 and P. Baker, ‘United Kingdom: Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP
Morgan Chase Bank NA’, in Duff et al. supra, Ch. 2.
53 Indofood, supra, [40].
54 Indofood, supra, [43].
55 Indofood, supra, [44].
56 PUT-23288/PP/M.11/13/2010. As the Dutch company was required de facto to pass on all interest received and performed no activities other than issuing bonds and on-
lending the funds, the court ruled that the company could not be regarded as the beneficial owner under the treaty.
57 PUT-13602/PP/M.I/13/2008. In this case the Indonesian tax authorities claimed that a company registered in Mauritius could not be regarded as the beneficial owner of the
dividends it received because of the existence of an interim (passive) holding company. The court refused, however, to uphold the claim because of the tax authorities’ failure
to substantiate it.
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Spain
In 2006 the Spanish Audiencia Nacional applied the term
‘beneficial owner’ as a broad anti-abuse provision.58 The
case involved a Hungarian company passing on
98%–99.5% of the royalties received from the football
club Real Madrid to a Dutch private limited company
under a licensing agreement. There was also a clear link
between the amounts received and paid in that the amount
owed by the Hungarian company was transferred to the
Netherlands on the same day or the day after the royalties
were received from Spain. The court subjected the term
‘beneficial owner’ to an arm’s length test. In other words,
was there a commercial reason for interposing the
Hungarian company? The court referred to documents
such as the Conduit Report and the 2003 OECD
Commentary in concluding that the payments in this case
were not made to a beneficial owner.59
The Spanish Tribunal Economico Administrativo Central
ruled in an entity conduit case that an English company
holding shares in a Spanish company was not the
beneficial owner of dividends received from Spain. In the
court’s view, the English company, which had no activities
other than holding the Spanish shares, had to be regarded
as an intermediary, a trustee or a person receiving income
for another party’s account (in other words, for the
shareholder resident in the United Arab Emirates).60
France
As in Diebold Courtage,61 the French Conseil d’Etat applied
the beneficial owner concept to its interpretation of the
1968 France-UK tax treaty in the Bank of Scotland case.62
In this case, a US parent of a French company had entered
into a usufruct agreement with the Bank of Scotland. This
three-year agreement entitled the bank to the dividend
coupons attached to the shares in the French company. The
latter distributed a dividend on 30 September 1993, and
the bank claimed it was eligible for the relevant benefits
under the tax treaty between the UK and France. The
Conseil d’Etat ruled, however, that the usufruct agreement
should be classified as a loan agreement under France’s
national anti-abuse rules. The Bank of Scotland had been
indemnified against any risk to which a shareholder would
normally be exposed and this meant, according to the
Conseil d’Etat, that it could not be regarded as the
beneficial owner of the dividends. The fact that the
recharacterization of the usufruct agreement was based on
a rule in national law led Gibert and Ouamane to conclude
that the term ‘beneficial owner’ did not allow scope for
such recharacterization.63 Gutmann too disagrees with the
approach of the Conseil d’Etat. In his view, the court
‘distorted the meaning of the concept because its goal was
to apply the French general anti-avoidance theory without
formally departing from the treaty rule’.64
Canada
The well-known Prévost Car Inc case65 relates to an entity
conduit. Prévost Holding BV was owned by residents of
the UK and Sweden and received dividends from its
Canadian subsidiary. The sole activity of Prévost Holding
BV was to hold the Canadian shares. The Canadian judge
stated the following in respect of the term ‘beneficial
owner’:
In my view the beneficial owner of dividends is the
person who receives the dividends for his or her own use
and enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of the
dividends he or she received. (…) When corporate
entities are concerned, one does not pierce the corporate
veil unless the corporation is a conduit for another
person and has absolutely no discretion as to the use or
application of funds put through it as conduit, or has
agreed to act on someone else’s behalf pursuant to that
person’s instructions without any right to do other than
what that person instructs it, for example, a stockbroker
who is the registered owner of the shares it holds for
clients.66
The Federal Court of Appeal agreed and concluded, based
on the facts of the case, that Prévost Holding BV was the
beneficial owner of the dividends received. Interestingly,
the court in first instance derived the above description
from Canadian common law. The Federal Court of Appeal
subsequently ruled this description of ‘beneficial owner’ to
be in accordance with the 2003 Commentary on the
Notes
58 Case 1110/2003 (Real Madrid FC). See Jiménez [supra note 9] for an overview of comparable cases and A.M. Jiménez, ‘Beneficial Ownership as a Broad Anti-Avoidance
Provision: Decisions by Spanish Courts and the OECD’s Discussion Draft’, in Duff et al. supra, Ch. 8.
59 Jiménez [supra, p. 40] points out that the Spanish court in this case did not examine the question of the legal ownership of the royalties paid and the extent to which the
Hungarian company could control the royalties.
60 RG 1481/2007.
61 See note 52.
62 Conseil d’Etat, 29 Dec. 2006, Case 283314. See also Gilbert and Oaumrane, supra, pp. 2–9 and Gutmann, supra, Ch. 11.
63 Gilbert and Oaumrane, supra, p. 9.
64 Gutmann, supra, para. 11.5.
65 Canada v. Prévost (2009 FCA 57), 26 Feb. 2009 (http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/en/2009/2009fca57/2009fca57.html). The decision in first instance: Prévost Car v. The Queen
(2008 TCC 231), 22 Apr. 2008 (http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/en/2008/2008tcc231/2008tcc231.html).
66 Prévost Car v. The Queen, supra, para. [100].
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OECD MC and the Conduit Report.67 It is unclear from
the judgment, however, whether the Federal Court also
wished to apply the factual test referred to in the
Commentary. This possibility cannot be excluded, given
the unconditioned reference to the Commentary. However,
the considerations mentioned above would seem to point
to a very strict, legal test.
The judgment in Prévost Car played a decisive role in
the Canadian Velcro case, which involved an income
conduit.68 The Dutch resident Velcro Holdings BV (‘VH’)
received royalties from Velcro Canada (a Canadian
resident). VH passed all (or almost all) of these royalties to
Velcro Industries BV (resident in the Netherlands
Antilles). The Canadian court ruled that VH should be
regarded as the beneficial owner if it had: (a) possession,
and (b) the right to use, and also (c) bore the risk, and (d)
had control of the royalties received. The court decided
that these conditions were met in this case because the
funds were not transferred to separate bank accounts, were
mixed with income from other sources and were wholly
and unrestrictedly available to VH. In my view, the court
in this case failed to recognize the nature of the
contractual relationship between VH and Velcro
Industries BV (‘VI’). VH was contractually obliged to pass
an amount equal to the royalties received (less a
commercial fee for services provided) to Velcro Industries
BV (a resident of the Netherlands Antilles) within thirty
days of receipt. In other words, in my view there was a
legal relationship between the royalties received by VH
and its payment liabilities.69
Czech Republic
In a case involving an entity conduit, the highest
administrative court in the Czech Republic ruled that a
company receiving dividends (in this case, a Dutch BV)
did not qualify as a beneficial owner if it did not exercise
its shareholder rights and its sole purpose was to act as a
conduit so as to enable a reduced rate of tax to be obtained
under a treaty.70 This judgment, however, did not clarify
matters in any way as the court failed to specify the
conditions in which beneficial ownership would be
considered to apply.
Denmark
The Danish tax authorities have been very active in recent
years in bringing cases involving alleged abuses of tax
treaties to court, both in situations involving entity
conduits and in situations involving income conduits.
This contribution examines firstly the views of the tax
court (Landsskatteretten) in the HHU income conduit case71
and secondly the judgment reached by the Court of East
Denmark (Østre Landsret) in the first ISS72 entity conduit
case.73
The HHU case concerned the question of whether a
Swedish company (‘AB 1’), established for the purposes of
acquiring a Danish company, was the beneficial owner,
within the meaning of the tax treaty between Denmark
and Sweden, of the interest it received. The shareholder of
AB 1 was also a Swedish company (‘AB 2’), the shares of
which were owned by a Jersey-resident company. AB 2
borrowed the funds to acquire the Danish company from
its shareholder and contributed the assets funded by this
loan as capital to AB 1. AB 1 lent the same amount to the
Danish company holding the acquired company. The
interest that AB 1 received (taxable in Sweden) was
transferred to AB 2 in the form of a (deductible) ‘group
contribution’74 (koncernbidrag). The latter company
subsequently passed the same amount of interest to its
shareholder. The net result was no taxable profit at either
AB 1 or AB 2. The court referred to paragraphs 8 and 8.1
of the 2003 Commentary on Article 11 of the OECD MC
in ruling that AB 1 was not the beneficial owner of the
interest paid. The court considered it important in this
respect that the Swedish companies did not actually have
any rights of control over the interest received, given that
they had no other sources of income with which to fulfil
their payment obligations. According to the court, the
Danish company de facto paid interest to the ultimate
Notes
67 ‘Most importantly, perhaps, the formulation accords with what is stated in the OECD Commentaries and in the Conduit Companies Report.’ Canada v. Prévost, supra, para.
[13].
68 See also Brian J. Arnold, Tax Treaty Case Law News – A Trio of Recent Cases on Beneficial Ownership, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2012, No. 6, and in ‘The Concept of
Beneficial Ownership under Canadian Tax Treaties’ in Duff, et al. supra, para. 3.3.3. and W.R. Munting, Beneficial Ownership: handle with care, WFR 2012/1064.
69 Arnold [‘The Concept of Beneficial Ownership under Canadian Tax Treaties’ in Duff, et al. supra, para. 3.3.3.] considers the outcome ‘cleary wrong’.
70 The Czech court applied the ‘beneficial owner’ concept in this case, even though the tax treaty between the Czech Republic and the Netherlands dates back to 1963 and
does not include a criterion of beneficial ownership. The tax authorities applied the substance-over-form approach from national law. According to the court, the benefits of
the treaty cannot be enjoyed. P. Fekar, Czech Supreme Administrative Court on Beneficial Ownership: Czech Supreme Administrative Court, Decision of 10 Jun. 2011, Ref. No. 2, Afs
86/2010-141, European Taxation 2011, No. 9/10, p. 418.
71 SKM 2011.57.
72 SKM 2012.121.
73 The other cases are SKM 2010.268, SKM 2010.729, SKM 2011.485, SKM 2012.409 and SKM 2012.729. For a discussion of these cases, see T. Booker, Recent Developments
Regarding Beneficial Ownership in Denmark, European Taxation 2012, pp. 67–76, J. Bundgaard, Danish Case Law Developments on Beneficial Ownership, Tax Notes International,
October 2012, pp. 63–74, H. Severin Hansen, L. Esbjerg Christensen and A. Endicott Pedersen, Danish ‘Beneficial Owner’ Cases – A Status Report, Bulletin for International
Taxation 2013, No. 4/5, and J. Bundgaard, ‘The Notion of Beneficial Ownership in Danish Case Law: The Creation of a New Legal Order with Uncertainty as a
Companion’, in Duff et al. supra, Ch. 6.
74 Use was made of the Swedish rule allowing profits and losses of companies within the same group to be offset via a group contribution.
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shareholder in Jersey, while another important
consideration for the court was that the sole purpose of
establishing the Swedish companies was to avoid Danish
withholding tax and that no net tax was paid in Sweden.75
In the ISS case, a Danish holding company (Holdco S A/
S) paid a dividend to its Luxembourg parent company
(LuxCo Sarl). This dividend was then transferred to the
Danish holding company as a loan. LuxCo Sarl had no
activities other than holding the shares in Holdco S A/S,
while it also had no employees and was managed by the
management companies of its shareholders, Goldman
Sachs and a private equity fund. The Danish court ruled,
with reference to Indofood, that the case involved an
international fiscal concept. The court also inferred from
the Conduit Report and the 2003 OECD Commentary
(which the court saw as clarification of the older
Commentary) that the term ‘beneficial owner’ could not
be used to combat every possible abuse (alleged or
otherwise) of tax treaties. If the relevant company law
allows a holding company board to exercise control of
dividends received, such a company cannot normally be
said not to be the beneficial owner. In principle this also
applies to the intermediate holding company. According
to the court, it had to be decided whether the shareholders
of such an intermediate holding company exercised a
degree of power and control extending beyond what was
normal in international groups. It is unclear, however,
whether these considerations were relevant to the
judgment ultimately reached. The deciding factor for the
court was ultimately the fact that LuxCo Sarl did not pass
the dividend received to a resident of a non-treaty state
and was also not obliged to pass on the dividend at a later
date. For that reason, LuxCo Sarl was ruled to be the
beneficial owner. The court seems to have considered the
only issue of importance to be whether the income was
passed to a resident of a non-treaty state. The capacity in
which any onward payment was made seems to have been
irrelevant.
Switzerland
The Swiss Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwal-
tungsgericht) applied a substance-over-form approach when
assessing whether a recipient of income was also the
beneficial owner of that income.76 In the case in question,
a Danish bank holding Swiss securities was involved in a
Total Return Equity Swap.77 The Swiss securities were
bought in order to hedge the obligations arising from the
swap transaction. The bank, however, was not obliged to
arrange this hedge. The question was whether the Danish
bank could be seen as the beneficial owner of the
dividends distributed on the Swiss shares. According to
the Swiss court, no account had to be taken of any
subjective element (i.e., the object and purpose of the
transactions were not relevant). Instead, the important
question was who was authorized to take decisions on the
income distributed? These powers had to be assessed on
the basis of the concrete facts and circumstances of the
case. According to the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, there could
be no beneficial ownership of the income in the event of
any obligation de jure or de facto to pass on or distribute
the income to a third party. If such an obligation existed,
the recipient could be regarded as having no decision-
making powers over that income. The court believed it
important to establish the degree to which the obligation
to pass on funds was dependent on receipt of the income78
and concluded from the facts of this case that the Danish
bank should be regarded as the beneficial owner. The court
also stated incidentally that the concept of beneficial
ownership was part of the attribution provisions and not
an anti-abuse concept.
5.3 Conclusions Based on the Examination of
Case Law
A number of elements of importance in assessing the
changes proposed by the OECD can be derived from the
case law examined. As far as entity conduits are concerned,
the main issue – in the absence of any obligation to pass
on income – is whether the degree of substance at the
conduit level, the control relationships within the group
and any abuse character in the use of the conduit are
relevant. The relevant issue in the case of income conduits
concerns the conditions attaching to the obligation to pass
on income. In most of the cases examined, the company
receiving the income is not regarded as the beneficial
Notes
75 There are some interesting similarities between the Danish court’s ruling and the decision by the highest Swedish administrative court (Högsta Förvaltningsdomstolen) of 21
May 2012 (case HFD 2012, note 24). This latter case concerned the scope of the term ‘beneficial owner’ within the context of an anti-abuse provision in national law and
involved a Swedish company that paid interest to a Dutch group company (‘BV I’). BV I formed a fiscal unity with BV II. The interest received by BV I was passed to BV II
as a dividend. BV II used this income to pay interest to its US parent company. The Swedish court ruled that BV I could not be regarded as the beneficial owner of the
interest, specifically because of the structure’s anti-abuse character. According to Kleist, this ruling is equally important for interpreting the term ‘beneficial owner’ in
Sweden’s tax treaties. D. Kleist, First Swedish Case on Beneficial Owner, Intertax 2013, No. 3, pp. 159–163.
76 ‘Der Begriff dient dazu, die Intensität der Beziehung zwischen einem Steurersubjekt und einem Steuerobjekt aus einer wirtschaftlichen Betrachtungsweise zu beurteilen.
Das Konzept des beneficial owner bezieht sich anhand einer sog. ‘substance-over-form’-Betrachtung auf die wirtschaftliche Realität und stellt nicht auf die (zivilrechteliche)
Form ab.’ Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 7 Mar. 2012, A-6537/2010. For a discussion of this case, see B. Arnold, Tax Treaty Case Law News – A Trio of Recent Cases on Beneficial
Ownership, Bulletin for International Taxation 2012, No. 6 and IFA, Seminar J: Recent developments in international tax, 4 Oct. 2012, published via www.ibfd.org. The
Bundesverwaltungsgericht reached the same conclusion in a comparable case. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 23 Jul. 2012, No. A-1246/2011 and No. A-6537/2010.
77 A financial instrument requiring one party to transfer all the proceeds from shares to another party in return for a fixed fee paid in instalments.
78 ‘3.4.2. (…) Die Entscheidungsbefugnis ist umso schwächer, je stärker eine gegenseitige oder wechselseitige Abhängigkeit bzw. Interdependenz zwischen den Einkünften
und der Pflicht zu deren Weiterleitung besteht.’
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owner if all or almost all the income is de facto passed on
to another party. Most of the national courts did not
consider the question of whether the receiving company
had full legal ownership of the income to be relevant.
Whether the nature of the obligation requiring the
income received to be passed on is relevant is unclear.
As a general rule, the question whether and, if so, in
which situations treaty states can apply the condition of
beneficial ownership in order to combat treaty shopping
should be made clear in the Commentary.79
6 THE 2012 OECD DISCUSSION DRAFT
This section examines the changes proposed in the
OECD’s discussion draft of 19 October 2012.80 This draft
contains substantial changes compared with the discussion
draft of 29 April 2011.81 The proposals contained in the
discussion draft of 19 October 2012 are included here in
full, insofar as relevant for this contribution:82
12.1 Since the term beneficial owner was added to
address potential difficulties arising from the use of the
words ‘paid to . . . a resident’ in paragraph 1, it was
intended to be interpreted in this context and not to
refer to any technical meaning that it could have had
under the domestic law of a specific country (in fact,
when it was added to the paragraph, the term did not
have a precise meaning in the law of many countries).
In my view, the OECD makes it clear in paragraph 12.1
that the beneficial ownership concept is an autonomous
tax treaty concept. Indeed the majority of commentators
on the first discussion draft supported this approach.
However, Munting and Huisman commented that – even
after amendment of the first draft – the OECD had still
not entirely ruled out the possibility of the concept being
interpreted in accordance with national law.83 They base
their conclusion on the OECD’s notes on the amendments
to the first draft. In my view, however, the wording of
paragraph 12.1 leaves no room for doubt in this respect.84
Paragraphs 12.2 and 12.3 accord with the current
paragraph 12.1 (see section 4.5 above for the wording),
while the examples given in 12.3 are further clarified
in 12.4:
12.4 In these various examples (agent, nominee,
conduit company acting as a fiduciary or administrator),
the recipient of the dividend is not the ‘beneficial
owner’ because that recipient’s right to use and enjoy
the dividend is constrained by a contractual or legal
obligation to pass on the payment received to another
person. Such an obligation will normally derive from
relevant legal documents but may also be found to exist
on the basis of facts and circumstances showing that, in
substance, the recipient clearly does not have the right
to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a
contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment
received to another person. This type of obligation must
be related to the payment received; it would therefore
not include contractual or legal obligations unrelated to
the payment received even if those obligations could
effectively result in the recipient using the payment
received to satisfy those obligations. Examples of such
unrelated obligations are those unrelated obligations
that the recipient may have as a debtor or as a party to
financial transactions or typical distribution obligations
of pension schemes and of collective investment vehicles
entitled to treaty benefits under the principles of
paragraphs 6.8 to 6.34 of the Commentary on Article 1.
Where the recipient of a dividend does have the right to
use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a
contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment
received to another person, the recipient is the
‘beneficial owner’ of that dividend. It should also be
noted that Article 10 refers to the beneficial owner of a
dividend as opposed to the owner of the shares, which
may be different in some cases.
The most important changes are found in paragraph 12.4.
In this new paragraph, the OECD emphasizes the limited
scope of the beneficial ownership concept as an anti-abuse
Notes
79 For example for situations such as the Danish HHU case, in which the application of national law (in this case, that of Sweden) de facto creates an income conduit.
80 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that, from 2010, the term ‘beneficial owner’ is also used in para. 6.14 of the Commentary on Art. 1 of the OECD MC (in
the context of ‘Collective Investment Vehicles’). This addition does not shed any new light, however, on the contents of the provision.
81 For a discussion of the changes, see Munting and Huisman, supra. One of the important changes relates to the passage contained in para. 12.4 of the original proposal and in
which it is stated that the recipient of the income cannot be considered the beneficial owner if this recipient ‘does not have the full right to use and enjoy the dividend that
it receives’. Almost all the reactions to the proposal for this passage were critical. See, for example, the reaction of Avery Jones, Vann and Wheeler, who conclude that this
wording incorrectly looks for full ownership of the income, whereas beneficial ownership of income is primarily an issue in situations in which a person has only limited
rights over the income, but nevertheless qualifies as the beneficial owner. J.F. Avery Jones, R. Vann and J. Wheeler, Response on the OECD Discussion Draft ‘Clarification of the
Meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention’, p. 1, <http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/48420432.pdf>.
82 The position of a trust as a beneficial owner is not discussed here as the case law examined does not consider this issue. For examples of commentary on this subject, see
Avery Jones, Vann and Wheeler, supra, p. 1, and Danon, supra, para. 4.
83 Munting and Huisman, supra, para. 2.1. As this contribution focuses primarily on the changes in the Commentary, no consideration is given to whether Art. 3(2) of the
OECD MC means that countries that define the concept of beneficial ownership in their national law have to use that national law definition when applying treaties based
on the OECD MC or whether the context requires there to be a tax treaty meaning autonomous of that national law concept. I agree with Pötgens [supra, pp. 167–176] that
the concept is an autonomous tax treaty concept.
84 Van Weeghel seems to reach the same conclusion. S. van Weeghel, ‘Enkele observaties over de uiteindelijk gerechtigde’, in Th. Groeneveld and L.J.A. Pieterse (eds.), Met oog
voor detail, liber amicorum mr. J.W. van den Berge, Den Haag: SDU 2013, p. 323.
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measure. The OECD favours an approach to the concept,
whereby a person is a beneficial owner of dividends
received unless the right to use and enjoy the dividends is
constrained by a contractual or legal obligation to pass the
funds received to another party. In the absence of any such
obligation, the relevant party will have beneficial
ownership, irrespective of any de facto constraints on its
right to use and enjoy the funds. These constraints could
include, for example, a situation in which group policy
required a company to distribute dividends received. As
no such contractual or legal obligation exists in the case of
entity conduits, this amendment confirms the conclusion
that the OECD will generally regard entity conduits as the
beneficial owner.85
If there is a contractual or legal obligation to pass the funds
received to another party, the question is how to assess
whether the right to use and enjoy the income is constrained
by that obligation.Although thewordingusedby theOECD
may be considered not entirely conclusive,86 inmy view such
constraint ‘will normally normally derive from relevant legal
documents butmay also be found to exist on the basis of facts
and circumstances (…)’. This approach resembles the one in
paragraph 44 of the Infofood judgment: ‘But themeaning to
be given to the phrase “beneficial owner” is plainly not to be
limited by so technical and legal an approach. Regard is to be
had to the substance of the matter.’87 It follows that the
beneficial owner should be able to have ‘unconstrained’
enjoyment of the income both de jure and de facto.88 It is
unclear tome, however, how the term ‘unconstrained’ relates
to the ‘very narrow powers’ referred to in the current
paragraph 12.1. Any relatively minor restriction of the right
to use and enjoy the income will lead to the conclusion that
this right is notunconstrained,while for the test inparagraph
12.1 one such limitation does not automatically mean there
to be ‘very narrowpowers’.
According to the new version of the discussion draft,
the legal or contractual obligation constraining the use
and enjoyment of the dividend must be related to the
payment received. Merely using the income to fulfil a
specific obligation does not mean there is a related
obligation in the sense referred to here. The relationship
required between the obligation and the income received
prompts various questions. The first of these relates to the
nature of the obligation: if interest is received, does the
payment have to be passed to another party in the form of
interest? This would seem to me to be the case, but it is
not evident from the notes. Another aspect that is unclear
is the perspective from which the existence of such an
obligation has to be assessed. Should the source state
decide on the basis of its own national law whether the
receiving company meets this requirement? This would
seem likely, given that it is the source state that has to
apply the reduced tax rate. The same applies in respect of a
residence state that may have to grant a foreign tax credit
in order to avoid double taxation.89 It would be advisable
to clarify this aspect.90
The next question is whether the extent of the
obligation matters. If an asset on which interest is received
is funded by a combination of own resources and borrowed
capital, is there still a relationship as referred to in
paragraph 12.3 in respect, for example, of the element
passed on to another party? And what if the asset is funded
wholly by borrowed capital, but not all the interest
received is passed to another party because a small amount
is retained as remuneration for the company borrowing
and on-lending the funds? The addition of paragraph 12.4
does not entirely clarify the position of income conduits,
therefore.91
Paragraph 12.5 examines the relationship with anti-
abuse provisions and explicitly states that the beneficial
ownership concept should not be seen as restricting the
application of general rules and specific anti-abuse
provisions in any way. The beneficial ownership concept
therefore has a limited scope.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Do the proposed changes remove the ambiguity in the
meaning of beneficial ownership that leads national courts
Notes
85 Based on the wording of para. 12.4 in the draft discussion of 29 Apr. 2011, Avery Jones, Vann and Wheeler [supra, p. 4] concluded that the possibility of an intermediate
holding company not being regarded as the beneficial owner was not excluded. They suggested that the only situation in which a recipient should not be regarded as the
beneficial owner was where there was a legal obligation to pass the income to another party.
86 Gutmann points to the question whether para. 12.4 says that ‘the obligation may stem from facts, as “a factual obligation” is close to nonsense.’ D. Gutmann, The 2011
Discussion Draft on Beneficial Ownership: What is Next for the OECD, in Duff et al. supra, Ch. 21.
87 Based on para. 44 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Baker concludes: ‘It is, therefore, relevant to examine all aspects of a transaction and not just its legal form when
enquiring into beneficial ownership.’ Baker, United Kingdom: Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NV, in Duff et al. supra, para. 2.5. The wording used
by the OECD could be inspired by the guidance provided by the UK HMRC after the Indofood-decision. In document INTM504030 is stated: ‘This obligation [to pass the
received income on to another person, addition JG] might be found in legal documents, but the Court of Appeal was also clear that such an obligation might also be found
by looking at the commercial and practical substance of an arrangement.’ Quoted from P. Baker, ‘United Kingdom; Indofood International Finance Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank NA’, in Duff et al. supra, para. 2.5.
88 According to Gutmann [supra, Ch. 21] the expression ‘in substance’ should be deleted from the para. 12.4 as it is ‘extremely unclear’.
89 See, for example, Art. 16 of the Dutch Double Taxation (Avoidance) Decree [Besluit voorkoming dubbele belasting] 2001.
90 See also the recommendations of Avery Jones, Vann and Wheeler, supra, p. 6. Please refer to Reimer who addresses two basic sets of elements that should be considered
dealing with the question of beneficial ownership: payments parameters and asset parameters. E. Reimer, ‘How to Conceptualize Beneficial Ownership’, in Duff et al. supra,
para. 18.5.
91 See also Van Weeghel [supra, p. 324].
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to interpret the concept in differing ways, and do these
changes mean that courts will in future be able to assume
a uniform understanding of the concept? On the basis of
the judgments examined, it can be stated that these
questions can only partially be answered in the affirmative.
First, it is important to note that all the judgments
examined assume the concept of beneficial ownership to
have a meaning that is autonomous of national law except
for the Canadian cases. In that respect, the addition in
paragraph 12.1 would seem of limited value.
Progress has been achieved, however, with regard to the
application of the beneficial ownership concept to entity
conduits. If there is no legal or contractual obligation to
pass dividends received to another party, an entity conduit
cannot be denied classification as a beneficial owner.
Treaty states wishing to exclude entity conduits from
reduced rates of withholding taxes will therefore have to
include supplementary provisions to this effect in their
treaties.92 Indeed the possibility of this is referred to in the
new paragraph 12.5. A number of the judgments
examined make reference to actual control relationships or
the use (or otherwise) of shareholder rights. Given the
changes proposed, however, these facts are not relevant for
determining beneficial ownership.
Although the ambiguity in respect of income conduits
persists, some progress has, I believe, been achieved in
respect of these situations. The explicit requirement for
the legal or contractual obligation constituting a
restriction on the use and enjoyment of the income to be
related to the payment received will ensure greater clarity.
The approach proposed in paragraph 12.4 is consistent
with the line followed in the vast majority of the
judgments. Almost all the cases involving an income
conduit include an obligation to pass on a payment
relating – either de jure or de facto – to the income
received. In this sense, almost all the judicial authorities
adopt a restrictive, rather juridical approach to the
concept, despite the references in many of these cases to a
wide anti-abuse provision. The critical issue is who is
entitled – either de jure or de facto – to use and enjoy the
income.
There are, however, differences in the factual grounds
on which the judicial authorities base their views on
whether funds received are passed on. It can be concluded
from the proposed changes that the following arguments
used by national courts are not relevant for determining
whether a party is a beneficial owner:
– the underlying reason for interposing the income
conduits. The beneficial ownership concept does not
imply the application of a business motives test;
– the nature and extent of the income conduit’s activities;
– whether the income conduit is subject to tax.
As mentioned above, paragraph 12.4 in the proposals does
not clarify whether a party can be considered the beneficial
owner if it is not required – de jure or de facto – to pass on
all the income. In the income conduit judgments
examined, all or a very substantial part of the income was
passed on. However, it is not possible to arrive at an exact
turning point on the basis of the case law to date.93
The question to be answered, with the above
considerations in mind, is whether additional amendments
to the Commentary or the OECD MC may help achieve
greater clarity. There are two aspects that I would see as
beneficial, in addition to the need to provide more
explanatory information on the questions raised in respect
of the wording of the proposals. First, including a
definition of beneficial owner in Articles 10, 11, and 12 of
the OECD MC would end the discussion of whether the
concept has an international fiscal meaning autonomous of
national law.94 Although the case law examined leads us to
conclude that most national courts interpret the beneficial
ownership concept as having an autonomous tax treaty
meaning, the reactions to the discussion draft showed that
this approach admittedly enjoys broadly based support,
but is not yet unanimously accepted. In my view, the
proposed changes provide a sufficient basis for compiling a
definition. A beneficial owner can be defined as a party
receiving income not for the risk and account of another
party and that is not obliged – de jure or de facto – to pass
on all or almost all of this income under a related legal or
contractual obligation.95
Even if this definition is adopted, a certain degree of
uncertainty will, however, remain as to whether the
recipient of the income is the beneficial owner, particularly
in situations in which a large part of, but not all the
income received is passed on. For that reason, I would
suggest limiting this uncertainty by including wording in
the Commentary to the effect that if the percentage that is
Notes
92 See also the comments in Vakstudie Nieuws 2012/62.4 and Munting and Huisman, supra, where an expectation that countries will introduce specific anti-abuse provisions is
voiced.
93 This relates to the question of when the existence of ‘narrow powers’ in respect of the income turn into the ‘very narrow powers’ referred to in the current para. 12.1 of the
Commentary.
94 Based on several branch reports for the 2010 IFA Congress in Rome, Van Weeghel already concluded that ‘the notion that the term needs no definition seems to be wrong.’
S. van Weeghel, Tax treaties and tax avoidance: application of anti-avoidance provisions, Cahier de droit international, Vol. 95a, Den Haag: SDU 2010, p. 20.
95 Van Weeghel proposes to include a definition that excludes agents and nominees as beneficial owners. He suggests that countries use other measures such as limitation on
benefits rules to combat treaty shopping. S. van Weeghel, ‘Enkele observaties over de uiteindelijk gerechtigde’, in Th. Groeneveld and L.J.A. Pieterse (eds.), Met oog voor
detail, liber amicorum mr. J.W. van den Berge, Den Haag: SDU 2013, p. 326.
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not passed on is consistent with an arm’s length fee for the
services provided in the examples referred to in paragraph
12.4 (‘agent, nominee, . . . fiduciary or administrator’), all
or almost all the incomewill be considered to be passed on.96
Obviously, the proposed de facto approach would even
after this addition affect to a certain extent the certainty
provided by the tax treaty. This is the main reason why a
more limited and strict legal approach is promoted by
various tax scholars, suggesting the introduction of
general anti-avoidance rules, limitation of benefits rules or
a main purpose test.97 There are however in my view good
arguments to take the suggested de facto approach. First,
despite any possibly valid hesitations from a historical
perspective the concept has already been recognized
broadly as an anti-abuse concept. Taking a pragmatic
approach there is no reason not to use this already
excisting concept especially under excisting treaties
without general or specific anti-avoidance rules. Second, as
also stated by Pistone, beneficial ownership clauses aim at
assuring a correct application of double tax treaty: is the
person claiming the treaty benefits really the person that
should benefit from the treaty?98 In that light the
intention of the parties involved is of little relevance when
applying the beneficial owner test.
The above leads me to conclude that the OECD’s
proposals create greater clarity on the concept of the
beneficial owner. Entity conduits will generally qualify as
the beneficial owner. Treaty states that regard this as
unwelcome will have to include supplementary provisions
to this effect in their treaties.99 Whether an income
conduit will constitute a beneficial owner will depend on
the facts and circumstances of the case. The OECD has
included a number of relevant criteria in the draft
Commentary in an effort to answer this question.
However, certain aspects of these criteria still need to be
elaborated in more detail.
Notes
96 See also Verdoner, Offermans and Huibregtse, who propose seeking alignment with the transfer pricing method. L. Verdoner, R. Offermans and S. Huibregtse, A Cross-
Country Perspective on Beneficial Ownership – Part 2, European Taxation 2010, No. 10.
97 For example Jiminez, supra, Ch. 8, Vann, supra, para. 19.6, Gutmann, supra, para. 11.5 and D.G. Duff, ‘Responses to Treaty Shopping: A Comparative Evaluation’, in
M. Lang et al. Tax Treaties from a Legal and Economic Perspective, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2010, p. 94.
98 Pistone, supra, para. 12.2.
99 For example through one of the measures suggested in the paras 13–20 in the OECD Commentary on Art. 1 OECD_MC.
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